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EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982:
PROSPECTS AND ANALYSIS
DOUGLAS RIGLER*
CAROL LOrTMAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal focus of U.S. antitrust law enforcement efforts has centered
on horizontal agreements between competitors - that is, agreements
concerning pricing, customer allocation or territorial allocation between
sellers of similar products.' Less enforcement emphasis has centered on
vertical relationships, such as those involving resale arrangements that lead
to final sale of the product,
The antitrust laws, of course, apply to both foreign and domestic
commerce. Not only is foreign commerce expressly designated as subject to
the proscriptions of the Sherman Act, but Section 4 of the Clayton Act
deliberately includes foreign persons and corporations among those entitled
to bring treble damage suits for antitrust law violations.'
The Sherman Act, that prohibits joint marketing activities by competi-
tors, was passed in 1890. By 1918, Congress had become concerned that in
many instances American companies were unable to compete against
international cartels for foreign sales. In response to this concern, Congress
enacted the Webb-Pomerene Act3 which grants a limited exemption to the
Sherman Act. It permits properly registered American companies to combine
and sell jointly in export trade. Members of a Webb-Pomerene association
may agree upon a common price for foreign sales and make market
* Douglas Rigler; B.S., U.S. Naval Academy; J.D. George Washington Univ.
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Jacobs, Washington, D.C.
** Carol Lottman; B.S. Northwestern Univ.; J.D. Georgetown Univ.; currently an
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1. Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter, head of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, recently stated: "The Antitrust Division has concentrated
its efforts in recent years on mergers that threaten horizontal competition; vertical and
conglomerate cases are no longer a major enforcement focus." Testimony before the
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Au-
gust 26, 1981.
William French Smith, in his first public statement since becoming Attorney
General, stated this policy on June 24, 1981, in a speech before the District of
Columbia Bar.
2. See Pfizer v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (holding that foreign governments are
entitled to sue for violations affecting foreign commerce).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. §§61-65 (1973).
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allocations abroad.' The exemption granted to Webb associations basically
confers immunity from liability for prohibited horizontal activity. No
corresponding exemption was granted with respect to vertical activities in
export trade. American sellers of goods or services in foreign commerce, thus
may be held to the same standard applied to companies engaged in purely
domestic sales except for the horizontal-type immunity available through
Webb-Pomerene registration.
For the last two years, Congress has been considering legislation that
would allow the formation of export trading companies. This legislation
would encourage vertical arrangements among American companies that are
doing or want to do business abroad. Specifically, the Export Trading
Company Act of 19811 permits, for the first time, the creation of single
entities in which manufacturers, sellers of goods, and providers of financial
and marketing services can combine vertical functions leading to the
ultimate delivery of a product. Thus, a single trading company might
coordinate product sales through market development, transportation
arrangements, financing and insurance - functions traditionally assumed by
banks or other nonmanufacturing companies.
In addition, the legislation would restructure the Webb-Pomerene Act in
several important respects. It would confer antitrust enforcement exemption
4. The Webb-Pomerene Act has not been free from controversy. Periodically,
Congress re-examines the Act's necessity and usefulness and proposals for repeal have
been introduced. In 1979 the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures recommended repealing or limiting Webb-Pomerene. The Department
of Justice (which frequently has supported amendment or repeal of the Act) has coun-
tered the argument that without the Webb-Pomerene exemption American companies
would be disadvantaged in competing against foreign cartels by referring to its busi-
ness advisory procedure. Under this procedure, companies may describe to the Depart-
ment of Justice a proposed course of action and the Department will indicate whether it
intends to initiate criminal proceedings should such activities occur. In fact, once a
favorable clearance has been received, the activity is not likely to be challenged in a
civil proceeding, but the Department has the option of withdrawing its clearance, and
any substantial change in the nature of the activity renders the advice ineffective. The
problem with reliance on an advisory opinion is that the opinion is not binding on
private parties who may wish to challenge the activity in an antitrust suit, and the
risk associated with such activity remains with the companies.
5. The original bill, the Export Trading Company Act of 1980 S.2718, 96th
CONG., 2d SEss. (1980); was passed by the Senate unanimously on September 3, 1980.
The House of Representatives did not take up the bill in 1980. In the 97th Congress,
Senator Danforth reintroduced the Export Trading Company Act which is nearly iden-
tical to the 1980 version. The 1981 Act, S.734, 97th CONG., 1st SESS. (1981) [hereinafter
cited as the ETC Act]; passed the Senate unanimously on April 8, 1981, and has been
referred to three committees of the House of Representatives.
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on American companies that provide services as well as goods.6 Jurisdiction
over Webb associations would be transferred from the Federal Trade
Commission to the Department of Commerce, and review by the Department
of Justice and the FTC prior to registration would be mandated.
This article explores the effects on trading opportunities that the Export
Trading Company Act of 1981 would offer if it becomes law.
II. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Rationale
Proponents of export trading company legislation can point to a
compelling array of figures to support their view that the health of the
United States economy depends upon increasing exports, and that U.S.
manufacturers are unduly restricted in the conduct of export trade.'
Large manufacturers, such as those in the steel, automobile, computer,
rubber and shipbuilding industries, assume their own direct supply and
marketing responsibilities both at home and abroad, rather than using
intermediaries. While there are non-industrial American trading companies,
they are generally specialized commodities traders handling grain, sugar,
coffee, etc. There are also some 2,000 American export-import firms in New
York alone which tend to specialize in single or related commodity groups.
Some Congressmen and business groups see a vast overseas market for
manufactured goods (especially in developing countries) that has been
penetrated by our international trade competitors, but not by U.S. com-
panies. The Act is designed to facilitate the export of U.S. products
(especially those made by small and medium-sized businesses) into the
overseas market by permitting the combination of financial resources,
expertise in market development and "dealmaking" into one-stop export
service agencies. The Act's sponsors believe that these Export Trading
6. A brokerage function, which in a sense is vertical, arguably might be avail-
able under the present Webb Act to associations formed to sell fungible commodities. In
fact, Webb associations tend to sell either directly for their own account, by-passing the
brokerage function, or sell to a broker who then resells to the foreign buyer.
7. The U.S. trade deficit for 1979 was $24.7 million; for 1980 it was just under
$30 million. According to the International Trade Administration of the United States
Department of Commerce, only a small percentage of American manufacturers (about
ten percent, or 25,000-30,000 out of 250,000-300,000) engage in exporting. Just 1,900
of the firms in the export trade account for 84 percent of the total U.S. export trade.
There are 20,000 more U.S. companies which could export profitably but do not. A 1980
study by the National Association of Manufacturers indicates that since 1970 imports
of manufactured goods have increased four times faster than exports, with the margin
growing in the latter half of the decade. Exports account for only 7.5 percent of our
GNP, as opposed to 22.6 percent of Germany's and 22.3 percent of Italy's.
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Companies (ETCs) will provide the economies of scale, diffusion of risk and
marketing ability through which smaller businesses will be enabled to
compete in international trade.
B. Provisions of the Act
The Act passed by the Senate on April 8, 1981, S.734, contains two titles
- the first known as the Export Trading Company Act of 1981 and the
second known as the Export Trade Association Act of 1981.
Title I provides that a banking organization may invest in the aggregate
up to 5 percent of its consolidated capital and surplus in the voting stock of
one or more export trading companies A banking organization may, within
the five percent limitation, invest up to $10,000,000 in one or more ETCs
without the prior approval of the appropriate Federal banking agency as long
as the investment does not cause an ETC to become a subsidiary of the bank.
It may invest more than $10,000,000 or make any investment that causes an
ETC to become a subsidiary or owned or controlled by the bank only with the
prior approval of the appropriate Federal banking agency.'
Title I imposes the following additional limitations on the relationship
between investing banks and ETCs:
1) The name of any ETC shall not be similar in any respect to that
of an investing bank organization unless the bank organization owns or
controls a majority of the ETC's outstanding voting stock or other
evidence of ownership. 0
2) The total cost of investments by a bank combined with
extensions of credit by the bank to an ETC may not exceed 10 percent of
the bank's capital and surplus."
8. A banking organization "means any State bank, national bank, Federal sav-
ings bank, bankers' bank, bank holding company, Edge Act Corporation or Agreement
Corporation." The ETC Act, S. 734, 97th CONG., lsT SEss. § 105(a)(1) (1981). An Edge
Act Corporation or Agreement Corporation not engaged in banking may invest up to
25 percent of its consolidated capital and surplus. See § 105(b)(1).
9. Id. § 105(b)(1)(A) and (B). "Appropriate banking agency" means:
(a) the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to a national bank or any
bank located in the District of Columbia;
(b) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to a
State member bank, bank holding company, Edge Act Corporation, or Agreement
Corporation;
(c) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with respect to a State non-
member insured bank; and
(d) the Federal Home Loan Bank Board with respect to a Federal savings
bank. ETC Act § 105(a)(9).
10. Id., § 105(c)(1).
11. Id., § 105(c)(2).
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3) A bank may be forced to terminate its ownership or be subjected
to other conditions in its relationship with an ETC if the appropriate
banking agency determines that the ETC has taken positions in
commodities, securities, or foreign exchange other than those necessary
to its business operations.'2
4) Banking organizations may not extend credit to an ETC in
which they hold stock on terms more favorable than those extended to
similar borrowers in similar circumstances.'3
5) Other limitations or conditions, including termination of own-
ership by a banking organization, may be required by the appropriate
federal banking agency to limit the bank's financial exposure, or
prevent conflicts of interest and unsound banking practices."
Title I also directs the Export-Import Bank of the United States to
guarantee loans by financial institutions and other private creditors to ETCs
when such loans are secured by export accounts receivable or inventories of
exportable goods. If adequate financing is not otherwise available, the
Export-Import Bank may proceed as determined by its Board of Directors.
The Bank must attempt to ensure that a major -share of these export loan
guarantees goes to small, medium-sized and minority businesses or agri-
cultural concerns.
15
Title II amends the Webb-Pomerene Act" to allow firms that provide
services as well as goods to combine to facilitate joint exporting. It transfers
responsibility for administering the Act from the Federal Trade Commission
to the Secretary of Commerce. Under this title, export trade associations that
are formed for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and that do not
substantially lessen competition or restrain trade within the United States
are exempt from the operation of antitrust laws with respect to their export
trade activities once the association is certified by the Secretary of
Commerce."
The Act requires that applicants provide certain information prior to
certification as an export trade association. The Secretary of Commerce, after
consultation with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission,
may approve or deny certification. The Secretary of Commerce will have the
responsibility to draw up guidelines by which ETC applications shall be
reviewed." Although the Secretary of Commerce has primary responsibility
12. Id., § 105(c)(3).
13. Id., § 105(c)(4).
14. Id., § 105(d)(2) and (4).
15. Id., § 106.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
17. The ETC Act, supra note 5 § 204.
18. Id., § 106(a). Title I provides for automatic certification of Webb-Pomerene
Associations registered with the FTC as of January 1, 1981.
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for issuing a certificate, only the Attorney General or the FTC may bring an
action for revocation of a certificate. 9 No person other than the Attorney
General or the FTC will have standing under the Act to bring an action
against an ETC. Therefore, while an ETC may lose its certification, it may
not be sued either by private parties or by the government for damages
resulting from activities outside those permitted by the Act.
HI. TITLE I: EQUITY PARTICIPATION BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
IN EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES
The Export Trading Company Act has been inspired in some measure by
the success of the Japanese "sogo shosha."' These are multi-billion dollar
trading conglomerates with huge assets and interlocking ties to government,
banking and manufacturing. These conglomerates provide financial services,
business information and auxiliary international trade services such as
documentation, insurance, warehousing and transportation. They conduct
extensive two-way, third-country, "barter and switch" trade, as well as
arranging for the export of Japanese products.
The development of these post-war Japanese trading conglomerates has
been characterized by the intricate involvement of banks. The shortage of
capital and underdevelopment of Japan's export market has also resulted in a
capital structure for Japanese corporations that is leveraged far beyond that
of U.S. corporations.
The Act's sponsors believe that by removing barriers to the establish-
ment of "one-stop" export service organizations, average-size American
businesses will be able to enter the export market and compete successfully
with their foreign counterparts.
A. The Japanese Model
The sogo shosha provide a phenomenally successful model for general
trading companies. Their trade expertise has enabled Japan, one of the
world's most densely populated countries and one least blessed with natural
resources, to survive economically. To obtain vital raw materials, Japan had
to import; to pay for imports, Japan had to export.2'
19. Id.
20. Certain European countries and Brazil also have strong trading companies.
21. In 1977, Japan imported 99.7 percent of its petroleum, 76.6 percent of its coal,
73.0 percent of its natural gas, 98.8 percent of its iron ore, 92.8 percent of its copper,
100 percent of its lumber, 100 percent of its wool and cotton, 96.0 percent of its wheat,
97.0 percent of its soybeans. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), The Role of
Trading Companies in Internation Commerce 21 (1980).
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While there are approximately 8,000 trading companies in Japan, there
are nine giant, highly diversified firms that are known as sogo shosha -
general trading companies.' During the 1975 Japanese fiscal year, they had
gross sales of $155 billion, accounted for 56.4 percent of Japan's exports, 55.6
percent of its imports, and 18 percent of its domestic wholesale total.'
Though none has a strong manufacturing base, the sogo shosha facilitate the
trade of thousands of products while functioning as a trade intermediary.2
They provide financial services, business information, and auxiliary interna-
tional trade services such as documentation, insurance, warehousing and
transportation.' Since the 1970's, with the establishment of foreign sub-
sidiaries and branches, the sogo shosha have also been actively organizing
and investing in overseas manufacturing projects.
The nine major companies are primarily large-volume, first stage
wholesale traders of industrial raw materials and grains, and of such
standardized intermediate products as steel, synthetic fiber and fertilizer.
Price, speed of information and economies of scale are important in sales of
these kinds of products, which require little engineering service to manufac-
turers, minimum sales promotion and minimal repair or other after-sale
service to retail customers.
The Export Trading Company Act contemplates a multi-service trading
organization designed to foster the export of goods manufactured in the
United States - probably with substantial participation by the manufac-
turer in the trading company itself. Japanese trading companies, on the other
hand, conduct much of their business in two-way buyer-seller transactions
and third-country trade. An example of two-way trade would be the purchase
of iron-ore and coal from an Australian mining company and sale of mining
and transportation equipment manufactured in Japan in return, or the
importation of grain from the United States and reciprocal sale of fertilizer to
U.S. farmers. Third-country trade is trade between two foreign countries
where the Japanese firm would handle negotiations, contracting and
financial arrangement, without the direct involvement of Japan as a source
of supply or market. For example, Japanese trading companies might sell
U.S.-manufactured gas turbines to Indonesia or import Brazilian coffee to
22. In order of sales volume, they are: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, C. Itoh & Co.,
Marubeni, Sumitomo, Missholwai, Toyo Menka Kaisha (Tomen), Kanematsu-Gosho,
and Michimen.
23. YOUNG, THE SOGO SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES 4
(1979) [hereinafter cited as YOUNG].
24. Each trading company typically handles from 10,000 to 20,000 products -
principally foodstuffs, textiles, metals, machinery and chemicals. Id.
25. Id. at 57-68.
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Europe. 6 Third-country trade is expected to provide greater opportunities for
the sogo shosha in the future, because of the increasing exports of industrial
plants and equipment for international engineering projects - particularly
in developing countries. 7
The trading firms also conduct "barter-trade" (exchange of goods
between two countries without the use of money) and "switch trade" (import
of goods from a second country through the use of a third country's currency
as a currency of settlement).
The nine sogo shosha are, in short, trading conglomerates, not manufac-
turing conglomerates. They own hundreds of small subsidiaries and joint
ventures in Japan and elsewhere that engage in resource prospecting and
development, manufacturing and processing, construction, financing, leasing,
and subcontracting. All are owned and run to support the core purposes of
buying, selling and generating new business opportunities. For these
reasons, a majority of the subsidiaries controlled by the sogo shosha are
involved in sales, warehousing, transportation and other service industries.'
B. History and Character of Bank Involvement in Sogo Shosha
The origin of general trading companies dates from the 1870's when
Japan, under the control of the new Meijii government, resumed interna-
tional trade after two centuries of self-imposed isolation. The government
embarked on a program of industrialization through the development of
foreign trade. The modern trading companies had their start as family-run
business entities similar to Western corporations, but with strong family
loyalties and obligations. The heads of these families had close political ties
26. YOUNG cites the following examples of multi-country trade conducted entirely
outside Japan by one of the trading giants:
[Ulpon receiving a request from a Brazilian textile manufacturer for Polyester
fibers, a large general trading company approached a major American chemical
company. The chemical firm was willing to supply the fibers but was short of
ethylene glycol, an essential raw material. The general trading company asked a
French firm to supply the necessary ethylene glycol, but was informed that they
could do so only if the trading firm could provide them with benzene. The general
trading company turned to firms in the U.S. and Holland and obtained the ben-
zene for the French manufacturer, who then supplied the trading company with
ethylene glycol. Thus, the American chemical concern was finally able to provide
the Brazilian textile maker with polyester fibers. The transaction involved four
countries and five different trading company offices. It was concluded in one week.
YOUNG at 11.
27. See, e.g., Special Advertising Supplement on Japanese Trade, FORTUNE, August
10, 1981, at 82.
28. YOUNG, supra note 23 at 12-13.
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to the government, which gave them financial assistance and encourage-
ment. Beginning usually with trade in one dominant commodity or industry,
they gradually expanded into banking, ship building, mining and other areas
that supported their trading activity. Ownership remained in the hands of
the founding families until the mid-1930s, when stock in certain of the
trading conglomerates was first offered on a limited scale to the Japanese
public. After that time, while the founding families continued to exert control
over the conglomerate through holding companies, day-to-day management
gradually was transferred to professional managers.
After World War II, occupation authorities forced the families to dispose
of their stock in the holding companies, and split the two largest conglomer-
ates, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, into many separate companies (170 and 139
respectively). The breakup of these two giants allowed the growth of other
small and medium-sized firms engaged in foreign trade.
In addition, "bank-centered" conglomerate groups began forming in the
post-war period. In particular, three large banks unaffiliated with earlier
large trade organizations, prodded firms that were .financially dependent on
them into forming new interlocking conglomerates that in turn became
affiliated with trading companies. Those three trading companies are now
large enough to be included among the nine sogo shosha.a
In general, the development and regrouping of the post-war trade
conglomerates was fostered and characterized by the involvement of banks.
Financial institutions were largely exempt from dissolution orders and
antitrust laws under the occupation." The practice of giving preferential
loans at lower rates to selected groups, the shortage of capital in Japan's
rapidly growing economy, and the underdevelopment of Japan's export
market led to the dependence of manufacturing firms on the financial
institutions. These elements also led to the highly-leveraged capital structure
of Japanese corporations.3
The relationships among financial institutions, members of conglomerate
groups and the sogo shosha remain complex and interlocking, with signifi-
cant mutual stock holdings. Although the sogo shosha do not limit their
financial and trade dealings to affiliated banks and manufacturing firms,
their complex interrelationships generally assure them access to important
29. The Daiichi Kangyo Bank group, the Sanwa Bank group and the Fuyo group
each rely on one of the sogo shosha as their core supply and distribution channel.
YOUNG at 37.
30. There was a limit on stock investment by a financial institution in a given
domestic corporation that was raised in 1953 from five to ten percent of the institu-
tion's own capital. YOUNG at 36.
31. Id.
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assets which facilitate their trade activities, such as: capital at preferred
rates, expertise, raw materials, equipment, and advanced technology.
C. The Banking Committee Hearings: Support and Reservations
Prior to passage of the Act in April 1981 a subcommittee of the Senate
Banking Committee held hearings on S.734 in February and March 1981.2
Extensive hearings had been held on the 1980 Act by the full Senate
Banking Committee, a Senate Banking subcommittee, and two House
banking subcommittees. The House committee has not yet held or scheduled
hearings on the 1981 Act.
The 1981 Senate hearings revealed strong bipartisan support for the bill.
(Senator Heinz pointed out in his opening statement that every member of
the committee who was in the Senate in 1980 voted for the bill that year.)
Senator Proxmire, expressing some reservations about whether the U.S.
trade profile necessitated unbridled bank control of ETCs, favored an
amendment to minimize bank equity risk, but acknowledged that the bill had
no real opposition. His statement before the 1980 full committee hearings,
which he chaired, showed considerably more concern about the banking and
antitrust implications of the bill. However, Senate passage of the bill this
year seems assured, despite those concerns.
The justification for bank equity participation was stated by former
Senator Stevenson, who returned for the hearings in order to support the
legislation he is credited with initiating:
The American banks are uniquely situated to organize and operate
trading companies. They have networks and correspondents which reach
all firms in the United States in all markets, in all regions of the United
States, and into all markets of the world. With those correspondent
relationships, their financial resources, branches, trade financing ex-
perience, banks are positioned as are no other institutions in the United
States to get the trading companies off the ground and operating on a
profitable basis.3
The primary opponents of the bill's banking provisions, the Federal
Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, argued that the Act
represents an unprecedented breach of the separation of banking and
32. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary
Policy of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, on S. 734, 97th CoNiG.,
1st SEss. (February 17, 18 and March 5, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Banking Sub-
committee Hearings].
33. Id. at 4.
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commerce functions that has long been traditional in this country. The
separation is felt to be necessary in order to avoid substantial risk to the
safety and soundness of the banking system and to preserve the banks' role
as impartial arbiters of credit." The Federal Reserve Board recommended
that bank ownership interest be limited to less than 20 percent of the stock of
an ETC. With a higher ownership interest, a bank may be tempted by the
rule of equity accounting to push a trading company into relatively risky
types of operations in the hope of realizing short-term gains in bank
earnings. 5 The risk is exacerbated by the high level of leveraging that the
trading companies frequently require. Moreover, while bankers have the
necessary financial expertise, export trading companies will be complex
commercial enterprises requiring management expertise in many diverse
areas.
It was further argued that a bank might be motivated to assist a
foundering export trading company that it sponsored. Also, a bank might
incur legal liability if, for example, it provided management or engaged in
significant intercompany transactions. Moreover, a bank might take unwar-
ranted risks to aid such a troubled subsidiary in order to protect the parent
company's reputation in the business community."
These fears were realized to some extent through recent experiences with
bank-sponsored Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). In 1972 in particu-
lar, banks suffered large losses that were attributed to their provision of
assistance to REITs because of legal liability stemming from interlocking
officers and directors, the provision of advisory services, and because they
feared that failure to aid sponsored REITs would damage their reputations in
business and financial circles as well as the general community.
These risks led the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Irvine H. Sprague, to propose in both the 1980 and the 1981
hearings that the Act be amended to limit any one bank's interest in an ETC
to twenty percent of the voting stock, and any group of banking organizations
to fifty percent. The recommendations were not adopted. In addition, the
FDIC recommended that any investment by a banking organization be
subject to prior approval by the appropriate Federal banking agency.
34. Id. at 66. (Statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors, Fed-
eral Reserve System).
35. Under the equity accounting rule, at a level of ownership interest of 20 percent
or above, a bank can include in its earnings a proportionate share of the earnings of a
trading company. At a level of ownership below 20 percent, a bank could count as
earnings only the dividends received from the trading company.
36. 1981 Senate Banking Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 32 at 117-18. (State-
ment of Irvine H. Sprague, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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Supporters of the Act responded to these concerns by pointing to
risk-limiting safeguards built into the legislation. They insisted that a
substantial degree of bank equity participation is necessary to assure the
success of ETCs and that precedent exists to demonstrate successful bank
equity participation in Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs).
There are six safeguards in the Act designed to prevent any exposure
beyond traditional prudential limits for either controlling or noncontrolling
investments. These are:
(1) A provision that no banking organization (except an Edge Act
Corporation not engaged in banking) may invest more than five percent
of its capital and surplus in the stock of one or more ETCs.
(2) A provision that no banking organization may invest and lend
more than ten percent of its capital and surplus in the aggregate and on
a consolidated basis in or to an ETC. This ensures that the financial
limitations of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act apply to all
banking organization/ETC investments, irrespective of whether the
ETC is a majority-controlled affiliate. In contrast, bank-sponsored
REITs have been considered outside the limitations of Section 23A. This
provision thus puts a total cap on exposure to a controlled or
non-controlled ETC.
(3) The name of an ETC cannot be similar in any respect to that of
a banking organization investor. This eliminates public confusion
between a banking organization and an ETC affiliate and avoids some of
the problems that arose in the REIT area.
(4) A banking organization must terminate its ownership of an
ETC if the ETC takes speculative positions in commodities. This
protects against an ETC affiliate's engaging in non-productive, purely
speculative activities that could put a banking organization investment
at risk. In this regard, this provision effectively will require any
banking organization investor to ensure that there are adequate
internal controls against speculation by the ETC.
(5) The Act specifically prohibits a bank from making preferential
loans to an ETC in which it has an equity interest; this prohibition
includes preferential loans to any customer of such ETC. The language
of the prohibition parallels that in the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRICA) on insider loans, and is
thus a type of prohibition regularly enforced by bank examiners and
bank regulatory agencies.
(6) The banking agencies are given authority to require divesti-
ture of any ETC investment that may constitute a serious risk to a
banking organization investor. Again, this parallels powers which the
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Federal Reserve was given under FIRICA over other bank holding
company investments.
In addition, there are the following regulatory safeguards provided over
controlling investments:
(1) Any controlling investment, even if less than $10 million, must
be approved by a bank regulatory agency.
(2) No group of banks can acquire more than fifty percent of an
ETC without prior agency approval.
(3) The agencies can disapprove any application for investment
where, in their judgment, adverse banking factors outweigh export
benefits.
(4) The agencies can impose additional conditions and limitations
on controlling investments to limit a banking organization's financial
exposure or prevent possible conflicts of interest or unsound banking
practices.
(5) The agencies can examine banking organization-controlled
ETCs and use cease-and-desist authority to enforce any and all
requirements imposed under the law.
Representatives of banking organizations described an additional safe-
guard which is not contained in the language of the Act, but is created by the
realities of doing business: a banking organization with a controlling
investment, may itself be in the best position to protect its investment and
regulate risk exposure. In this regard, many U.S. banking organizations
already follow a policy in their international operations of favoring control-
ling investments, since equity control ensures operational control and thereby
better risk management. 7 The banks that are most likely to form and
participate in ETCs already have national and foreign operations through
branches, agents, or correspondant banks. They are already in the business of
evaluating risks, researching foreign markets and providing financing. They
have existing relationships with many domestic manufacturing companies.
They are in the best position to provide access to capital, expertise in
marketing services, maximum efficiency, and have the ability to serve as
"dealmakers" by virtue of their familiarity with all aspects of international
transactions and their ability to bring together the essential parties to such a
transaction.
37. Id. at 195. (Statement of J. Hallam Dawson, President, Bankers Ass'n for
Foreign Trade, and President, Crocker National Bank).
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Whatever dangers or risks of banking involvement remain despite
statutory and regulatory safeguards, equity participation by banks is
generally regarded as essential to the success of ETCs and successful ETCs
are widely regarded as a potential contributor to the economic health of the
United States. The various banking committee and subcommittee hearings
make clear that there has never been a realistic hope of passing legislation,
at least in the Senate, that disallowed bank control.
It is expected, however, that the bill will encounter some resistance in
the House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs from Congress-
man Fernand J. St. Germain (R.I.), Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance. During hear-
ings on the 1980 Act, St. Germain expressed doubts that any but a small
number of large banks would be able to surmount the bureaucratic
registration hurdle to participation in ETCs, and doubts as to whether banks
would use impartial judgment in financing enterprises in which they
themselves have a substantial interest.
IV. AN APPRAISAL: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT MAY BE
JEOPARDIZED BY CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
The foregoing summary of the Act and its debated points presents a
dichotomy of views which suggest that the Act may have difficulty in
achieving its intended purpose. This appears due to the attempted accom-
modation of different policy objectives.
An analysis begins with the asserted necessity for the Act and the
benefits to be derived from it. The success of the sogo shosha in penetrating
world markets and the resulting boost to the Japanese economy is the model
for success. If the sogo shosha could succeed, then American companies
should be able to do likewise. The problem is that the American model does
not parallel the Japanese system, but departs significantly with respect to
certain crucial elements.
One of the first and most apparent departures from the Japanese system
is the continued limitation on capital/equity involvement by the American
banks which are supposed to be the driving force in the establishment and
success of the export trading companies. A five percent limitation on the use
of bank assets to be invested in an export trading company effectively
precludes most American banks from competing on an equivalent basis with
the nine leading sogo shosha. The prospect of various banks pooling
investments to form a single export trading company may not be an
attractive alternative since there will be dispersion of management and
perhaps a corresponding lack of clear direction and control.
Another immediately apparent limitation on the success of the concept is
the $10 million capital contribution limitation. Provision is made for larger
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investments with the prior consent of the appropriate banking agency, but
guidelines for such approval have not been established and there is at least a
suggestion inherent in the limitation that approval may be given grudgingly.
The capital limitation provision thus presents a scenario where many
export trading companies would rapidly encounter size and capital limita-
tions. One speculates that really large projects will continue to be financed as
they are today, since the benefits of combining vertical functions may be lost
in the complexities of overcoming severe limitations on capital contribution.
The erection of barriers to the size of ETCs probably is not accidental. It
reflects a traditional suspicion of large business entities and a concern that
the perceived project opportunities of the ETCs should not flow exclusively to
a comparatively small handful of giant financial institutions. Thus, an
environment of trading companies limited in size and capital in many
respects is consistent with the desire of certain sponsors of the Act. It follows
the theme of opening up export opportunities to small and medium-sized
American companies. However, to reiterate, small and medium-sized Amer-
ican companies may not turn out to be effective competitors of larger trading
companies, chartered in other counties, which impose less severe capital
limitations.
Another reflection of the Act's self-limitation is the provision which
requires the Export-Import Bank to ensure that a major share of loan
guarantees support small and medium-size minority businesses or agricul-
tural concerns. Once again, policy objectives related to small business are not
necessarily consistent with a statutory framework providing for maximum
American competition in foreign markets.
The American ETC model presents yet another major contrast with the
Japanese model. We have seen that the sogo shosha concentrate on trading
and are likely to serve as the intermediary between a manufacturer and a
consumer. This is not to say that the sogo shosha do not possess manufactur-
ing capability and they are certainly capable of carrying products and
inventory to supply any market they wish to serve. They display a certain
flexibility in moving in and out of product markets and trade on a short-term
basis in products for which they have made no long-term commitment. A
basic premise of the American Export Trading Company Act, on the other
hand, is that manufacturing companies will be long-term equity owners or
affiliates of the ETC. Continuity of market and creation of long term demand
are objectives of the American plan to enhance the sales of medium and
small-size manufacturing companies. The American premise, therefore, locks
American firms into a set corporate enterprise with an attendant reduction
in flexibility.
The success of the sogo shosha has been established. One may only
speculate as to whether American ETCs will be able to match their
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established success in light of these fundamental differences in operating
structure. Certainly, to the extent that major equity interests in an ETC are
represented by dedicated manufacturing facilities, the American companies
will be tied to sales of particular products on a far more long-term basis.
Referring to yet another of the "safeguard" provisions, we see that the
ETC may not attempt to borrow credibility from the name of a sponsoring
financial institution. This is a reflection of long-held American concerns for
the safety of banks, and as noted, some unfortunate recent experiences with
real estate investment trusts. However, the same reasons which caused the
REITs to choose names linked to their bank sponsorship would seem to apply
in the area of export trade. If the Act is designed to enable American
companies to compete vigorously for foreign sales, identification with
recognized names should be an important asset of these new business
ventures. The same safeguard provisions which reflect concern over the
stability of our financial institutions, may impose competitive limitations on
the success of the new ETCs.
Limitations on capital contributions, size, control, and the ability to
utilize established names, all suggest tenuous commitments by financial
institutions to ETCs which at least initially will prevent most of them from
matching the marketing muscle of established Japanese competitors. The
anti self-dealing provision that requires banks to deal with their export
trading companies on terms no more favorable than the terms extended to
other customers, again contrasts with the Japanese example.3 The Japanese
financial institutions dealt with their captive trading companies on more
favorable terms than those offered to other customers in order to build up the
strength of the concern. American policies dealing with the proper role of
banks and the quality of access to capital markets conflict with the Japanese
model.
The above examples illustrate that because of the conflict between the
purpose of the ETC Act and historic American policy considerations, there
are conflicting tensions within the Act. The examples also illustrate that
resolution of these tensions may impose reduced effectiveness on the ETC
concept or may result in a lack of interest in the formation and use of ETCs.
38. While it is beyond the scope of this article, the most-favored nations clause
presents some intriguing issues of its own. How does one determine which of a bank's
customers are most favored? How is that favoritism expressed? Are these return con-
siderations to the bank which justify the favored status (e.g., favoritism expressed in
terms of a lower interest rate may be offset by the borrowing corporation carrying a
high corresponding balance)? If so, would these same return considerations apply to the
ETC or could it merely demand as a matter of statutory right that it receive the fa-
vored treatment?
EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT OF 1982
V. TITLE II: ANTrImusT IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACT
Under the Senate bill, the Commerce Department could immunize from
the antitrust laws the "export trade activities and methods of operations" of
ETCs. If Commerce later determined that the activities of ETCs had
substantial anticompetitive effect in the United States, it could revoke the
immunity. Even were this to occur, however, neither private parties nor the
government could sue the ETC for damages.
Following House Judiciary Committee hearings in early 1981, Chairman
Rodino proposed that, rather than establish ETCs through a separate bill, the
antitrust laws should be amended to create a simplified ETC certification
procedure and to allow private single (rather than treble) damage suits
against ETCs found to have domestic anticompetitive effect. The Rodino
proposal was the result of a compromise between the recognition of the value of
ETCs and the inevitability of the Act's passage, and recurring objections to
the ETC concept as presented in the Senate bill. The principal objections
based upon possible anticompetitive effects are:
(1) The certification procedure is so cumbersome that only large
businesses will be able to successfully pursue it. Thus, the Act's
purported benefit to small and medium-sized businesses is a disguise to
allow large manufacturers to engage in anticompetitive practices
without a penalty once they surmount the hurdle posed by registration. 9
(2) The Webb-Pomerene Act has failed to serve its intended
purpose of enabling smaller businesses to compete in foreign markets;
expanding it would not help firms, but would hurt them by allowing
large corporations to pursue cartel-related activities at home and
abroad. In 1979, the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures recommended eliminating or at least limiting
Webb-Pomerene. As of November 1978, only twenty-nine Webb-
Pomerene associations existed, which accounted for less than two
percent of export trade, and eighty percent of those were composed of
large firms.
(3) Creating exceptions to U.S. antitrust laws to foster export
cartels would create foreign policy embarrassments adversely affecting
39. Once again, crossed purposes lead to tensions within the Act. If the objective of
the Webb-Pomerene Act is to enable small and medium-sized American companies to
achieve economies and foreign competitors in the world market, the criticism may be
valid. On the other hand, if an objective is to enable U.S. companies to compete against
large foreign competitors in the world market, then artificial restrictions on the size of
the U.S. companies participating will be counterproductive.
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pro-competitive diplomatic activities. For example, any anti-OPEC
initiative in the face of the ETC Act would seem hypocritical. It would
also appear ironic that during the occupation following World War II,
the United States created antitrust laws and dismantled and prosecuted
the Japanese cartels which we now seek to emulate.
(4) Putting the certification and revocation procedure in the hands
of the Commerce Department ensures that antitrust considerations will
be given short shrift. Commerce's function is to promote trade, not to
enforce antitrust laws.
These criticisms of the Act also raise the philosophical issue of whether
the United States can, in good conscience, encourage other commercial
nations to adopt U.S.-type antitrust laws.
With respect to the philosophical criticism, it seems dubious that with or
without Webb-Pomerene or ETC registration other nations will move to
adopt their own equivalents of the Sherman Act. Some countries, e.g.,
Canada and the EEC nations, already have antimonopoly legislation and the
adoption of their laws was not influenced appreciably by the existence of the
U.S. Webb-Pomerene Act. Moreover, foreign nations wishing to emulate the
American antitrust standard can forbid sales by Webb associations.
The past utility of Webb associations raises the issue of the success of the
Webb-Pomerene Act itself. Accepting a figure of two percent for the volume
of export trade channeled through Webb associations, that figure is still large
in terms of absolute dollars. Even if the Act is under-utilized, there is little
reason to disturb sales now made through Webb-Pomerene associations. If
one reads the figures as showing a successful history of Webb-Pomerene
associations, then continuation of the legislation is consistent with the
general purpose of the Export Trading Company Act.
In sum, critics of the present Webb-Pomerene Act do not appear to have
presented any valid reasons for its dismantling or for the creation of ETCs.
This is particularly true if expansion of export trade has become more, rather
than less, of a commercial policy objective of the United States.
Changes in Webb Act administration and operation proposed in the ETC
Act are not likely to have significant impact on its use, although administra-
tion by the Commerce Department may be beneficial and stimulate interest
in Webb association membership. However, a more complex qualification and
registration procedure, involving a more active role for the Department of
Justice, can serve only to discourage additional registrations - especially in
industries that have not taken advantage of the Webb-Pomerene opportunity
for foreign sales in the past. Despite these pros and cons, the changes do not
appear so monumental as to be controlling over a decision whether to form a
Webb association or an ETC. The changes may have some impact on close
decisions, or where an industry consensus is difficult to achieve, but where
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there is fairly universal agreement within an industry to form an ETC or to
sell through a Webb association, registration hurdles are not likely to pose
an insuperable barrier. Some comfort may be taken from the fact that
associations which have already met the criteria for registration will enjoy
antitrust immunity under the new Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ETC Act offers an interesting possibility for expansion of U.S.
foreign trade. Other countries, notably Japan, have been successful in
utilizing trading companies to combine vertical functions which enables the
integrated unit to efficiently compete against the separate and disjointed
U.S. entities that each pursue different functions in the overall transaction.
The ETC Act is an attempt by the United States to follow the foreign model.
The legislation as presently drafted, however, appears tentative in its
support of the concept. The attempt to satisfy policy concerns (which
historically have limited bank involvement in commercial ventures) and the
desire to promote small business participation do not harmonize and may
inhibit the overall effectiveness of the trading companies chartered under the
Act. Such inhibition may limit the Act's effectiveness in achieving its goal of
expanding U.S. foreign trade.
